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This article examines a practice whereby lawyers use the internet to research prospective jurors 
with a view to challenge. It is unclear how common the practice is in New Zealand, but the 
increasing availability of personal information online means that lawyers have a plethora of 
personal information about prospective jurors at their fingertips. Currently peremptory challenges 
are exercised in a discriminatory fashion on the basis of broad stereotypes. It is argued that pretrial 
research by lawyers on prospective jurors could secure a more impartial jury by providing a 
mechanism for uncovering attitudinal biases or predispositions, meaning the challenges will be 
exercised on the basis of stereotypes alone less often. Pretrial research by lawyers could also 
remedy the disparity of resources between prosecution and defence by providing an independent 
vehicle for obtaining information. This article discusses the benefits of pretrial research of 
prospective jurors and argues that any drawbacks are limited. Potential guidelines for lawyers 
conducting pretrial research around the collection, use, retention and disclosure of information are 
proposed. This article concludes that pretrial research of prospective jurors serves to protect, 
rather than undermine, the fundamental right of all parties to a fair trial. 
I WHOSE TRIAL IS IT ANYWAY? 
The use of technology by all parties in court proceedings has raised issues for courts in New 
Zealand and abroad. The rapid increase in the dissemination and preservation of information 
through social networking sites means that people have ready access to more personal information 
via the internet. Courts and academics alike have grappled with the question of how to manage the 
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use of this technology in a trial setting to ensure that all parties to a proceeding receive a fair trial.1 
In relation to jury trials, this problem has two facets – research by jurors and research about jurors 
(by defendants or lawyers). This article looks at the merits and drawbacks of lawyers using the 
internet to research jurors with a view to challenge without cause (henceforth referred to as 
peremptory challenge).  
Research by jurors, coined the problem of the "Googling Juror",2 has received a lot of attention 
in recent times.3 Jurors conducting their own internet research of cases in the United Kingdom have 
been convicted of contempt of court and sentenced to imprisonment.4 Concerns about the impact of 
technology are not confined to its use by jurors. The use of technology to garner information about 
jurors also appears to be increasing. For example, P v R, a case before the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal in 2012 concerned a convicted defendant (P) who used the internet to research the personal 
background of the foreperson of the jury that found him guilty.5 The jury had found the appellant 
guilty on six charges of performing an indecent act on a child under s 132(3) of the Crimes Act 
1961. After his conviction, P uncovered communications on the juror's Facebook page, which he 
alleged were indicative of bias against his case. The communications included statements such as 
"people who assault children, sexually or physically, should receive harsh punishment", as well as 
criticisms of sentences handed down in unrelated cases of indecent acts on a minor.6 P then lodged 
an appeal on three grounds, one being that the trial lawyer failed to challenge without cause the 
foreperson of the jury.  
  
1  See David Harvey, Judge of the District Court of New Zealand "The Googling Juror: The Fate of the Jury 
Trial in the Digital Paradigm" (paper presented to 13th International Criminal Law Congress, Queenstown, 
September 2012); P v R [2012] NZCA 325; Attorney-General v Fraill & Sewart [2011] EWHC 1629 
(Admin); Attorney-General v Dallas [2012] EWHC 156 (Admin). In the United States context, see 
Thaddeus Hoffmeister "Google, Gadgets, and Guilt: Juror Misconduct in the Digital Age" (2012) 83 
UCOLR 409. 
2  See Steven Price "Googling Jurors Again" (25 March 2009) Media Law Journal 
<www.medialawjournal.co.nz>. 
3  For an in-depth discussion of issues surrounding juror use of the internet, see Harvey, above n 1.  
4  See Attorney-General v Fraill & Sewart, above n 1; and Attorney-General v Dallas, above n 1. Joanne Fraill 
was convicted of contempt of court and sentenced to eight months' imprisonment for communicating with 
an acquitted defendant via Facebook while serving on the jury. Theodora Dallas, a juror, was sentenced to 
six months' imprisonment for contempt of court after telling her fellow jurors that the defendant had 
previously been accused of rape after conducting her own internet research. 
5  P v R, above n 1. 
6  At [13].  
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The Court of Appeal refused to entertain the ground of appeal, stating that the appellant's actions 
in conducting such research into the personal background of the particular juror were deplorable.7 
The Court said that any action by a defendant, whether before, during or after trial that would 
encroach on the privacy and security of a juror or prospective juror would be viewed "extremely 
seriously" and may amount to contempt of court.8 However, the issue of lawyers researching jurors 
has not yet been the subject of investigation in the New Zealand context. It is not clear how 
widespread the practice is, but it has been the subject of at least one New Zealand case where a 
judge apparently refused a request from lawyers to abort a trial after internet research revealed a 
relationship between a juror and a witness. 9  The Law Commission has indicated that it will 
investigate issues surrounding lawyers researching jurors in a review of the law of contempt.10 
The courts and Parliament have been concerned to prevent the use of technology in a manner 
that undermines the right to a fair trial. For example, in P v R the use of the internet to research a 
juror by a convicted defendant was held to be "entirely inappropriate and unacceptable". 11 
Likewise, a juror who conducts his or her own research on a case may be held to be in contempt of 
court. This article argues that, in contrast, pretrial research of jurors by lawyers with a view to 
peremptory challenge could serve to ensure, rather than undermine, a fair trial for all parties 
involved in a proceeding.  It is not suggested that the practice would result in the perfect exercise of 
the peremptory right in every case, but it is argued that limited research by lawyers on prospective 
jurors could secure a more impartial jury and remedy the disparity of resources between the 
prosecution and defence by providing lawyers with an independent vehicle to obtain information 
about prospective jurors.  
The first part of this article will briefly outline the jury selection process and the peremptory 
challenge. The past, present and possible future basis for the exercise of peremptory challenges will 
then be addressed. The main body of the article will discuss the benefits and possible drawbacks of 
pretrial research of prospective jurors with a view to peremptory challenge. Before concluding, draft 
guidelines for lawyers in conducting research of prospective jurors will be recommended.  
  
7  At [14]. 
8  At [20]. 
9  Edward Gay "Lawyers Googling of Jurors to Come Under Scrutiny" The New Zealand Herald (online ed, 
Auckland, 23 January 2013). 
10  Gay, above n 9. The Law Commission is currently undertaking a first principles review of the law of 
contempt of court. An issues paper is due to be published in 2014: Law Commission "Review of Contempt 
of Court" (11 April 2013) <www.lawcom.govt.nz>. 
11  P v R, above n 1, at [21]. 
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II THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS 
Before delving into the merits and drawbacks of pretrial research of jurors by lawyers it is 
necessary to outline the statutory framework that the peremptory challenge operates within and the 
primary rationales behind its exercise. With certain exceptions contained in the Juries Act 1981, any 
person between the ages of 20 and 65 years who is currently registered as an elector is eligible for 
jury service.12 When a jury panel is required, the registrar of the relevant court randomly draws 
names from the jury list and those that are picked are summoned to court.13 Any person sentenced 
to imprisonment for a term of three or more years, or to preventive detention, is disqualified from 
serving on a jury, 14  as is any one who, in the preceding five years, has been sentenced to 
imprisonment for three or more months. 15 Persons occupying certain positions at the time of 
summons such as ministers, judges and practising barristers and solicitors are also disqualified from 
serving on a jury.16  
Section 14(1) of the Juries Act provides that an eligible person may apply to the registrar of the 
court to have the jury panel list made available for examination up to seven days before the trial 
date. Only the names of the prospective jurors are contained on the jury panel list.17 However, the 
registrar of the relevant court must comply with the request of certain eligible persons to make 
available a copy of protected particulars excluded from the jury panel list.18 Protected particulars 
include the address, occupation and date of birth of prospective jurors.19 In the absence of internet 
research of a prospective juror, the information contained on the jury panel list often informs the 
exercise of peremptory challenge. 
  
12  Section 6.  
13  Section 13. 
14  Section 7(a). 
15  Section 7(b). 
16  Section 8. 
17  Section 13(1A) of the Juries Act 1981 was inserted by s 16 of the Juries (Jury Service and Protection of 
Particulars of Jury List Information) Amendment Act 2012 on 29 April 2013. 
18  Section 14AB of the Juries Act 1981 provides that only certain "eligible persons", as listed in s 14(AB)(2), 
may apply to the registrar of the court to inspect a prospective juror's protected particulars. An "eligible 
person" means a barrister or solicitor acting for a party to the proceedings due to be heard, or a barrister or 
solicitor appointed for the purpose of inspecting protected particulars and exercising rights of challenge for 
a litigant in person, the Crown or prosecutor in criminal proceedings, or a Police employee acting in the 
course of their employment. 
19  The Juries Amendment Act 2008, which came into force on 25 December 2008, amended the principal Act 
by removing the prohibition of jurors' dates of birth being referred to on the jury list. 
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When potential jurors arrive at court, the balloting process takes place. If a potential juror's card 
is drawn out of the ballot box,20 their name is read out and they must make their way to their seat in 
the jury box. 21 It is at this point that challenges may be made. A juror who is successfully 
challenged before sitting down must stand down and are excluded from taking any further part in the 
trial.22  
There are three different types of challenges: challenges for want of qualification, challenge for 
cause and the peremptory challenge, with which this article is primarily concerned. Section 23 of the 
Juries Act provides that a juror may be challenged and discharged if they fail to qualify under 
section 6, or if they are disqualified from serving on the jury under ss 7 or 8. Each party is entitled to 
an unlimited number of challenges for cause on the ground that a juror is not indifferent between the 
parties or is incapable of discharging their role as a juror due to disability.23 However, the use of 
challenge for cause in New Zealand has been rare. One senior judge suggested the infrequency of 
challenges for cause was a result of the need to prove something that is "damning" to the person 
being challenged and the subsequent risk of such a challenge being unsuccessful.24  
In contrast to challenges for cause, peremptory challenges are often used in New Zealand. Trial 
by Peers, a seminal study into the composition of New Zealand juries, reported that prosecution and 
defence counsel peremptorily challenged 36.5 per cent of balloted jurors.25 Section 24(1) of the 
Juries Act provides that each party is entitled to exercise four peremptory challenges against 
potential jurors.26 In a criminal case involving two or more accused persons, the prosecution is 
entitled to a maximum of eight peremptory challenges.27  
  
20  Jury Rules 1990, r 15. 
21  Jury Rules 1990, r 19. 
22  S Dunstan, J Paulin and KA Atkinson Trial by Peers?: The Composition of New Zealand Juries 
(Department of Justice, Wellington, 1995) [Trial by Peers] at 55. 
23  Juries Act 1981, s 25. 
24  Law Commission Juries in Criminal Trials (NZLC R69, 2001) [Juries In Criminal Trials] at [227]. See Sir 
Graham Speight "Submission to the Law Commission on Juries in Criminal Trials". 
25  Trial by Peers, above n 22, at 56. In contrast, the use of the peremptory challenge in England was relatively 
rare before it was abolished in 1989. See Morris B Hoffman "Peremptory Challenges Should be Abolished: 
A Trial Judge's Perspective" (1997) 64 U Chi L Rev 809 for an in-depth analysis of the history of the 
peremptory challenge. 
26  Section 17 of the Juries Amendment Act 2008 reduced the number of peremptory challenges available to 
each party from six to four.  
27  Juries Act 1981, s 24(2). 
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In its report Juries in Criminal Trials, the Law Commission outlined two primary rationales for 
the peremptory challenge. First, the peremptory challenge is said to secure an impartial jury by 
providing an efficient mechanism for removing jurors where the defence or prosecution have doubts 
as to their impartiality short of justifying challenge for cause. 28 Proponents of the peremptory 
challenge claim that allowing each side to remove jurors they believe to be partial towards their case 
enables extremes of the jury pool to be eliminated on both sides.29 What is left is a jury composed 
of the "moderate middle".30  
However, in practice the function of peremptory challenges in removing biased jurors is largely 
circumvented, as usually the objective of counsel is to secure a jury favourable to their client by 
retaining jurors who may be biased towards their case.31 Further, the limited information available 
about prospective jurors means the prospect of discerning any actual or potential impartiality on the 
part of jurors is unlikely. Prosecution and defence counsel are therefore forced to exercise the right 
to peremptory challenge based on stereotypes and assumptions. Thus it seems that the role of 
peremptory challenge in obtaining an impartial jury is largely symbolic.  
The second rationale for peremptory challenge is that it gives the defendant a measure of control 
over the composition of the jury by allowing the defence to exclude prospective jurors perceived, 
rightly or wrongly, to be biased against the defence.32 Proponents of peremptory challenge argue 
that this results in greater acceptance of the jury's verdict as fair by the defendant and the wider 
public.33 The peremptory challenge is therefore one mechanism by which justice "can be seen to be 
done".34 The Law Commission highlighted the fact that the removal of the right to peremptory 
challenge may reduce the confidence of the defendant in the validity of the jury's verdict, leaving the 
system open to criticism.35 Evidently, the appellant in P v R said that an indication to his trial 
lawyer that he wished to challenge the particular juror during empaneling was ignored. 36 This 
failure formed the basis of the appeal against the jury's verdict. 
  
28  Juries in Criminal Trials, above n 24, at [218]. 
29  Roger Allan Ford "Modelling the Effects of Peremptory Challenges on Jury Selection and Jury Verdicts" 
(2010) 17 Geo Mason Law Rev 377 at 377. 
30  At 377.  
31  Law Commission Juries in Criminal Trials Part One (NZLC PP32, 1998) [Juries in Criminal Trials Part 
One] at [392]. 
32  Juries in Criminal Trials, above n 24, at [218]. 
33  Juries in Criminal Trials, above n 24, at [218]. 
34  R v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 at 259.   
35  Juries in Criminal Trials Part One, above n 31, at [393]. 
36  P v R, above n 1, at footnote 7. 
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Whether or not the peremptory challenge meets its purported rationales has been the subject of 
debate.37 The inclination of other jurisdictions has been to remove the peremptory right.38 England 
and Wales abolished the right of peremptory challenge in 1988.39 After an extensive review, the 
Law Commission recommended the retention of the peremptory challenge,40 despite conceding that 
it could not demonstrate whether the exercise of the challenge meets its claimed rationales.41  
It is argued that allowing lawyers to garner more information about prospective jurors through 
the internet would allow them to find actual or perceived biases, enabling the peremptory challenge 
to fulfil its purported rationale of securing an impartial jury. Rather than playing a solely symbolic 
role, a more informed exercise of the peremptory right would increase the confidence of the 
defendant in the fairness of the jury's final verdict. The next part of this article will discuss the 
exercise of peremptory challenge absent research by lawyers and highlight new technology that 
could enable lawyers to exercise the peremptory right on a more sound evidential basis. 
III LAWYERS RESEARCHING JURORS: PAST, CURRENT AND 
POSSIBLE FUTURE PRACTICE 
A Past Practice 
In the New Zealand context, there is little historical evidence of lawyers researching jurors, 
though there has been some suggestion of an emerging trial consulting industry. 42  Several 
psychologists were reported to be advising counsel on who to challenge using information gathered 
through the observation of the jury pool, public records and credit checks.43 That said, it is unclear 
how common the practice is in New Zealand.  
In contrast, researching prospective jurors in the United States is undertaken extensively. 44 
Dissatisfied with the limited information available from the court, attorneys began investigating 
prospective jurors in the early 20th century.45 Public and private investigators were hired to aid in 
  
37  See Hoffman, above n 25.  
38  Juries in Criminal Trials Part One, above n 31, at [365]. 
39  Section 118(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (UK) provides that "the right to challenge jurors without 
cause in proceedings for the trial of a person on indictment is abolished". 
40  Juries in Criminal Trials, above n 24, at [229]. 
41  Juries in Criminal Trials Part One, above n 31, at [397]. 
42  Juries in Criminal Trials, above n 24, at [249]–[250]. 
43  At [250]. 
44  Thaddeus Hoffmeister "Investigating Jurors in the Digital Age: One Click at a Time" (2012) 60 U Kan L 
Rev 611 at 615. 
45  At 616. 
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the selection of a jury. Information gathering methods ranged from researching public archives to 
more intrusive methods such as "drive-bys" of the juror's house, speaking with the juror's 
neighbours or following the juror.46 Such investigations gave insight into a juror's socio-economic 
background, opinions and personal habits, providing invaluable information for attorneys looking to 
challenge potential jurors who had certain characteristics.47 "Trial consulting" in the United States 
has since developed into a completely unregulated, multi-million dollar industry.  
B The Basis upon which Peremptory Challenges are Currently 
Exercised 
Currently, three main sources of information form the basis for the exclusion of potential jurors 
through peremptory challenge:  
• The information provided on the jury panel list and protected particulars including the 
name, address, occupation and date of birth of prospective jurors.  
• The appearance and general demeanour of prospective jurors.  
• Police vetted jury panel lists; a resource which is exclusive to the prosecution. 
Research conducted into the composition of juries in New Zealand found that the address of a 
potential juror was often a deciding factor in whether they would be peremptorily challenged.48 
Both prosecution and defence counsel felt that addresses served as an indicator of the views or 
prejudices a potential juror may hold. Those from a middle-class background were assumed to be 
more likely to hold a bias against perpetrators of certain types of offending, such as burglary, as they 
felt particularly vulnerable to it.49 Thus the defence invariably challenged such people. Prosecution 
counsel were likely to challenge people from areas that were thought to have "sympathies with the 
accused or the groups that the accused may be from".50 
Similarly, potential jurors in certain occupations were more likely to be challenged. Prejudice 
against school teachers and law students was a common thread from both prosecution and defence 
counsel in the Trial by Peers report, the assumption being that they were likely to cause hung juries 
by "holding out" or by trying to swing the vote.51 As will be discussed in more depth further on, 
  
46  At 618. 
47  At 618. 
48  Trial by Peers, above n 22, at 115. 
49  At 116. 
50  At 116. 
51  At 118. 
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ethnicity also appeared to play a large role in the decision to exercise a peremptory challenge. Māori 
men, in particular, have been under-represented on juries as a result of peremptory challenges.52  
The overall appearance and demeanour of potential jurors was another aspect informing the 
exercise of the peremptory challenge. As aptly put by one counsel: "You look at the way they dress, 
at the way they walk… [It's] all pure prejudice".53 Prosecution counsel had a tendency to challenge 
those who dressed "roughly" and were perceived to be more "liberal", while defence counsel 
challenged those who appeared "conservative", assuming them to be biased against the accused.54   
As concluded in Trial by Peers, counsel tend to "make assumptions of bias and use catch-all 
categories" when exercising the peremptory challenge.55 Counsel recognise that assumptions based 
on the limited information they receive regarding prospective jurors can be quite wrong, but in the 
absence of further information they are forced to exercise challenges on such a basis.56  
In addition to the basic personal details from the jury panel list and protected particulars, and the 
overall appearance of jurors, information gathered through jury vetting (checking the backgrounds 
of potential jurors) is sometimes used as a foundation for the exercise of peremptory challenges. 
Typically the police assist prosecution counsel by annotating a copy of the jury panel list with any 
previous non-disqualifying criminal convictions. In some instances, particularly in smaller districts, 
the police will note any names on the list that they recognise or any known criminal gang 
connections.57  
However, the scope for vetting by defence counsel is limited, and in Trial by Peers it was 
confirmed that vetting by defence counsel was infrequent.58 Most showed the jury list to their client 
to see whether there was anyone they knew or wanted to challenge.59 In smaller districts, some 
defence counsel showed the list to other staff solicitors to gather information on potential jurors but 
it was noted that this was of little use in larger districts where personal knowledge of potential jurors 
  
52  At 57. The Solicitor-General, in response to these findings, issued an instruction to Crown solicitors stating 
that they should take whatever steps necessary to ensure that Māori men are not disproportionately 
challenged. 
53  At 122. 
54  At 121–122. 
55  At 129.  
56  At 129. 
57  Aysser Al-Janabi "A Study of Variations in Jury Vetting Practices Across New Zealand" (LLB (Hons) 
Dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington, 2011) at 13. 
58  Trial by Peers, above n 22, at 108. 
59  At 108. 
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was less likely. 60  Otherwise defence counsel "rely heavily on their intuition, experience and 
[judgement]" when making peremptory challenges.61  
The disparity between prosecution and defence in terms of their ability to obtain information 
about prospective jurors has caused some concern in relation to the potential imbalance of power it 
creates. As well as variations between prosecution and defence vetting practices, there are 
significant differences in jury vetting across districts. Although police vetting of jury lists occurs in 
all major High Court districts, with the exception of Auckland the extent of the information 
garnered varies.62 The use of the internet to conduct pretrial research on jurors has the potential to 
significantly decrease the disparity between prosecution and defence resources.  
C Possibilities for Future Practice 
As can be seen, lawyers peremptorily challenge jurors in a discriminatory fashion, not by 
choice, but due to a lack of information on which an informed decision can be made. However, the 
digital age has the potential to transform New Zealand lawyers into "amateur jury consultants". 
With the increased digital footprint of prospective jurors, lawyers now have a "treasure trove" of 
personal information at their fingertips.63 Public records are now available online. Social media 
sites such as Facebook and Twitter may be used to discover prospective jurors' religious views or 
expose any prejudices. The professional networking site LinkedIn may be used to uncover any 
business connections to a competitor of a party to the case.64 A simple Google search may expose 
any links a prospective juror has to particular political organisations.  
In the United States, the advent of the internet has streamlined the jury research process by 
allowing attorneys to conduct their own investigation of potential jurors, without having to use 
expensive jury consultants. Pretrial research of prospective jurors by lawyers has become routine.65 
Some practitioners argue that internet research into the personal backgrounds of potential jurors is 
necessary to fulfil the lawyer's professional duty of competence and due diligence.66 Courts in a 
number of states facilitate this practice by providing attorneys with information on prospective 
  
60  At 108. 
61  Gordon-Smith v R [2009] NZSC 20 at [27]. 
62  Regular police vetting of jury panel lists ceased in 1983. Police vetting is now only used in particularly 
contentious cases. See Al-Janabi, above n 57, at 7–8. 
63  Duncan Stark "Juror Investigation: Is In-Courtroom Internet Research Going to Far?" (2011) 7 Wash JL 
Tech & Arts 93 at 98. 
64  At 98. 
65  Hoffmeister, above n 44, at 612. 
66  Stark, above n 63, at 97. 
 JURORS ON TRIAL: LAWYERS USING THE INTERNET TO RESEARCH PROSPECTIVE JURORS 171 
jurors weeks in advance of the jury selection process. 67  Thus pretrial internet research of 
prospective jurors appears to be largely accepted in the United States, though some consider the 
practice raises ethical issues.68 
Although the internet is not always a reliable source of information, the nature of the peremptory 
challenge as a challenge without cause necessarily permits some lack of accuracy. As was noted 
earlier, it is not suggested that internet research will result in the perfect exercise of the peremptory 
right in every case, simply that it will provide an alternative to reliance on discriminatory 
stereotypes. In many instances this will result in the empanelling of a more impartial jury as the 
internet provides counsel with a means to uncover actual or perceived bias in prospective jurors. 
In the following parts, the benefits of exercising the peremptory challenge on a more informed 
basis will be discussed and drawbacks of the practice will be addressed. 
IV PROSPECTIVE JURORS ON TRIAL: THE BENEFITS  
A  A More Impartial Jury 
The primary justification for the exercise of peremptory challenge is the empanelment of an 
impartial jury. However, in the absence of any information on the personal attitudes and 
backgrounds of potential jurors, the peremptory challenge pays only lip service to the fundamental 
right of every citizen to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial court.69 Pretrial research by 
lawyers with a view to challenge can help ensure a more impartial jury in two ways: first, by 
providing more information about the backgrounds and attitudes of prospective jurors, and secondly 
by ensuring an equality of resources between prosecution and defence.  
The internet can be used by lawyers as a tool to garner more information about prospective 
jurors, allowing them to uncover attitudinal biases or predispositions that may affect the impartiality 
of prospective jurors. Vidmar's typology outlines four categories of bias, three of which highlight 
how pretrial internet research could uncover otherwise invisible bias:70 
• interest prejudice: where a juror has a direct interest in the outcome of the case; 
• specific prejudice: where attitudes or beliefs held by a juror in relation to a particular case 
or party might render them incapable of deciding the case in an impartial manner; and 
  
67  Adam J Hoskins "Armchair Jury Consultants: The Legal Implications and Benefits of Online Research of 
Prospective Jurors in the Facebook Era" (2012) 60 Minn L Rev 1100 at 1101. 
68  At 1101. 
69  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(1)(a). 
70  Neil Vidmar "A Historical and Comparative Perspective on the Common Law Jury" in Neil Vidmar (ed) 
World Jury Systems (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000) 1 at 32. 
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• generic prejudice: where a juror stereotypes a defendant, victim, witness or type of crime.  
Judging a prospective juror on the basis of their appearance, occupation, address or any other 
broad stereotype is unlikely to uncover bias. For example, a relationship between a potential juror 
and a witness (or an "interest bias") is unlikely to be uncovered by merely looking at the potential 
juror. Likewise, a specific prejudice on part of a juror will not usually be evident by simply looking 
at their particulars. As in the case of P v R, looking at a prospective juror's Facebook profile may 
reveal that a juror has an attitudinal bias against adults who indecently assault children (a "specific 
prejudice").71 Though this is not necessarily indicative of actual bias, as what people say in the 
abstract and what they do in specific situations may differ, at the very least it gives rise to a 
perceived bias. Pretrial research of prospective jurors may uncover such biases and, as a corollary, 
prevent questions arising about a juror's impartiality after a trial has finished.  
Pretrial research may also go some way to remedying the disparity between the resources 
available to prosecution and defence counsel. The assumption in the adversarial context is that each 
side will exclude potential jurors who are most favourable to the other side, resulting in an impartial 
jury. The problem with this assumption is that it assumes equality of resources between each side.72 
As Hoffmeister has highlighted, the government has traditionally held an advantage over the 
defence because it has the ability to access information not readily accessible to the wider public.73 
In the New Zealand context, there is often a significant disparity between the information provided 
to the Crown through police vetting and the limited information available to the defence.74 This 
inequality of resources can lead to differing levels of preparation for trial and can ultimately lead to 
an unfair trial.75  
The courts have recently compounded the disparity between prosecution and defence resources. 
In Australia, legislation has affirmed a High Court decision holding that the police vetting of jury 
panel lists for non-disqualifying convictions is unlawful.76 However, the New Zealand Supreme 
Court has recently affirmed the legality of the practice in Gordon-Smith v R.77 The first question on 
  
71  P v R, above n 1, at [13]. Statements found by the defendant on the juror's Facebook page included 
criticisms of sentences passed down on defendants in previous cases with similar facts.  
72  Franklin Strier and Donna Shestowsky "Profiling the Profilers: A Study of the Trial Consulting Profession, 
Its Impact on Trial Justice and What, If Anything, To Do About It" (1999) Wis L Rev 441 at 475. 
73  Hoffmeister, above n 44, at 616. 
74  Trial by Peers, above n 22, at 105–113.  
75  Hoskins, above n 67, at 1101. See also Strier and Shestowsky, above n 72, at 475. 
76  The Juries Act 2000 (Vic) affirmed the decision of the High Court of Australia in Katsuno v R [1999] 199 
CLR 40, which held that the Commissioner of Police did not have power to investigate and pass on to the 
Director for Public Prosecutions information regarding non-disqualifying convictions of potential jurors. 
77  Gordon-Smith v R, above n 61.  
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appeal was whether the police could lawfully obtain information about the criminal history of 
prospective jurors. The majority of the Court confirmed the finding of the Court of Appeal, holding 
that the police vetting of prospective jurors was lawful. On the second question, whether the Crown 
should provide such information to the defence, the majority held that the Crown was not permitted 
or required to disclose any previous convictions of potential jurors to the defence. An exception 
applies where the previous conviction "gives rise to a real risk that the juror might be prejudiced 
against the accused or in favour of the Crown".78 
McGrath J concurred with the majority of the Court regarding the legality of the practice of 
police vetting. However, on the question of whether the Crown was required to disclose vetted 
information to the defence, McGrath J gave a lengthy dissent, concluding that the Crown should 
provide the defence with all information about a potential juror that may be relevant to that juror's 
suitability to serve.79 McGrath J's position is similar to that in Canadian law where the prosecution 
must disclose all previous convictions of any prospective juror to the defence.80  
Ensuring an equality of arms between defence and prosecution counsel is an important 
consideration given the decision of the majority in Gordon-Smith v R, which removes the 
opportunity of defence counsel to benefit from police vetting practices. The exception to non-
disclosure is limited to situations involving a "real risk of prejudice". However, even the slightest 
risk of prejudice may affect the fundamental right to trial by an independent and impartial jury. The 
internet gives defence counsel in particular an independent vehicle to get information about 
prospective jurors. Internet research has the potential to level the "playing field" as information on 
the internet is free, easily accessible and available to all.  
Pretrial internet research has arguably become more important given the time and funding 
restrictions placed on criminal defence lawyers by changes to the legal aid system in 2012. The 
changes introduced a fixed fee system whereby lawyers are paid based on the seriousness of the 
charges facing their client instead of the hours they spend on their client's case.81 It is yet to be seen 
whether lawyers will have the time or inclination to conduct internet research on prospective jurors 
in light of the funding restraints. The use of the internet to research prospective jurors may vary 
according to the type of case at hand, with greater time being spent on more serious or high profile 
cases which, by reason of trial complexity, are entitled to greater legal aid funding. Lawyers may be 
  
78  At [22]. 
79  At [89] per McGrath J. 
80  R v Emms (2010) 264 CCC (3d) 402 (Ont CA) at [47]. 
81  See Gordon Campbell "Shedding Light on Legal Aid Changes" Dominion Post (online ed, Wellington, 27 
March 2013). The Court of Appeal recently ruled that the Government's policy in relation to legal aid 
funding is unlawful in Criminal Bar Association of New Zealand Inc v Attorney-General [2013] NZCA 176.  
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less inclined to give the same treatment to more straightforward cases due to time and funding 
constraints. However, given the speed and ease of access to the internet, pretrial research is unlikely 
to significantly increase the workload of lawyers and can provide a fast and effective means of 
uncovering actual or perceived bias. 
B A More Representative Jury 
The legitimacy of the jury lies in its democratic nature – all groups in the community should be 
represented in the composition of the jury.82 The "diversity of knowledge, perspectives and personal 
experiences" reflected in a representative jury "enhances the collective competency of the jury as 
fact-finder" and conscience of the community. 83  As Gonthier J noted in R v Biddle, though 
"representativeness" is not an essential quality of the jury, it is "a characteristic which furthers the 
perception of impartiality" and is therefore a trait that should be "sought after".84  
As reported in Trial by Peers, the representation of different groups has been negatively 
impacted by the use of peremptory challenges.85 In particular, peremptory challenges have been 
used to exclude a disproportionate percentage of prospective Māori jurors. 86  This lack of 
representation can in itself result in a type of bias.87 Indeed, the impetus for the Trial by Peers study 
was a 1988 report by Moana Jackson, which expressed concern at the "monocultural bias" in the 
New Zealand jury, partly due to the exercise of peremptory challenges.88 The question is whether 
the representativeness of the jury can be improved through the intelligent exercise of peremptory 
challenges. 
Prosecution counsel interviewed in Trial by Peers indicated that a Māori potential juror was 
more likely to be challenged if the accused was also Māori. This increased likelihood of challenge 
was based on the assumption that a Māori juror would be more sympathetic towards a Māori 
defendant, in which case a trial by "cultural or racial peers" was perceived to entail an element of 
bias towards the defendant.89 This perception was compounded where the Māori juror and the 
Māori accused shared a similar appearance. Further, a higher rate of convictions among Māori men 
informed the view that they were likely to be "anti-police" and therefore biased against the Crown 
  
82  Juries in Criminal Trials, above n 24, at [133]. 
83  At [133]. 
84  R v Biddle (1995) 96 CCC (3d) 321 (SCC) at [53]. 
85  Juries in Criminal Trials Part One, above n 31, at [392]. 
86  Trial by Peers, above n 22 at 33. 
87  Juries in Criminal Trials Part One, above n 31 at [392]. 
88  Moana Jackson He Whaipaanga Hou: Māori and the Criminal Justice System – A New Perspective 
(Department of Justice, Wellington, 1988) at 139. 
89  Juries in Criminal Trials Part One, above n 31, at [386]. 
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case, contributing to the disproportionate challenge rate.90 Adding to these considerations was the 
fact that Māori tended to be from lower socioeconomic groups, which the prosecution were inclined 
to challenge.91 
As can be seen, peremptory challenges are exercised not on the basis of actual or potential bias 
but instead on unsubstantiated assumptions and prejudices. In the absence of information as to a 
potential juror's personal background and possible attitudinal biases, counsel are forced to exercise 
peremptory challenges on these discriminatory bases. For many Māori defendants, juries are 
therefore not representative of their community or their values – Māori defendants are not tried by 
their peers.92 Online research of potential jurors may enable counsel to judge a potential juror's 
impartiality by reference to facts rather than his or her ethnicity.  
However, it must be highlighted that online research of prospective jurors is not a fix-all 
solution that will remove all prejudices entrenched over the years. There is a risk that additional 
information will simply compound prejudice. Although the evidence-based exercise of peremptory 
challenge could go some way to avoid the disproportionate exclusion of Māori from juries, it is 
unlikely to significantly impact on the representativeness of the jury. As the Law Commission 
noted, there are other factors contributing to the under-representation of Māori on the jury which 
must be addressed.93 Namely, Māori are more likely than Pākehā to have a disqualifying conviction 
under s 7 of the Juries Act. Further, non-disqualifying convictions may form the basis of a challenge 
by the prosecution if they indicate a potential bias against the prosecution or the police.94 Māori are 
also more likely to face barriers to jury service, such as lack of adequate child-care facilities or 
transport.95 
C Increased Confidence of the Defendant and the Wider Public in the 
Verdict of the Jury as Fair  
Although the effect of the evidence-based exercise of peremptory challenges on the 
representativeness of the jury is limited, it may give the defendant greater confidence in the jury and 
its verdict. As noted earlier, the peremptory challenge system can be supportive of the fair trial right 
  
90  Trial by Peers, above n 22, at 132. 
91  Trial by Peers, above n 22, at 136. 
92  Khylee Quince "Māori and the Criminal Justice System in New Zealand" in J Tolmie and W Brookbanks 
(eds) Criminal Justice in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Auckland, 2007) 333 at [12.3.3].  
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95  At [175]. 
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as it is one means by which justice "can be seen to be done".96 The fact that the role the peremptory 
challenge plays in this sense is symbolic does not diminish its importance. 
The case of P v R provides a poignant example of a defendant's lack of confidence in the jury as 
a result of perceived bias.97 Arguably, had pretrial research been conducted, the comments of the 
juror in question would have been discovered before the trial and the juror could have been 
challenged. The defendant's appeal on the basis of juror partiality would have been avoided, saving 
both time and money. While the juror may not have been operating under any actual bias, it is 
important to take into account the perception of the defendant and the wider public. It is likely a 
reasonable observer would have doubted the impartiality of the juror in question in light of the 
statements found on her Facebook page.  
Further, the disparity between the resources of the Crown and the defence noted earlier is likely 
to cause concern for defendants and the wider public. As highlighted by McGrath J in Gordon-Smith 
v R, a reasonable observer of the jury trial process would be likely to conclude that the Crown has a 
significant advantage over the defence in securing a jury.98 Reducing disparity between Crown and 
defence resources not only improves the impartiality of the jury in fact, but it also improves the 
defendant's and wider public perceptions of impartiality.  
D Lawyers Better Able to Fulfil Duty to Client 
In addition to securing a more impartial jury and increasing confidence in the jury's verdict, 
pretrial research of jurors may better assist practitioners with their overriding duty to the court and 
duty to act in the best interests of their clients.99 In the United States, internet research is used by 
parties in order to gain a "competitive edge" over their opposition. 100 Some suggest that not 
conducting pretrial research amounts to malpractice and a failure to "zealously advocate" the best 
interests of the client.101 Courts and bar associations across the United States have endorsed the 
practice. In 2011, the New York County Lawyers Association released an opinion stating, "it is 
proper and ethical … for a lawyer to undertake a pretrial search of a prospective juror's social 
networking site, provided there is no contact or communication with the prospective juror".102  
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Further, the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in Johnson v McCullough appears to place 
a burden on lawyers to examine and provide the court with a prospective juror's litigation history 
prior to trial.103 The case concerned a medical negligence lawsuit brought by a patient against a 
physician. Research into a particular juror after the jury had returned a verdict in favour of the 
defendant revealed that the juror had not disclosed their civil litigation history during voir dire. A 
new trial was ordered on the basis that the non-disclosure was prejudicial. 
Arguably, pretrial research on the part of the trial lawyer in P v R would have better served the 
interests of the defendant and the lawyer's overriding duty to the court. Though not suggesting that 
the foreperson of the jury was actually biased against the defendant, had the trial lawyer discovered 
the comments on the juror's Facebook page, the juror could have been challenged before the trial 
began, saving a costly appeal process. 
V PROSPECTIVE JURORS ON TRIAL: ADDRESSING FEARS 
A  Privacy and Perceptions of Potential Jurors104  
One criticism of the practice of lawyers researching prospective jurors with a view to 
peremptory challenge is the risk of encroaching on the privacy of jurors. As noted by academics and 
commentators across jurisdictions, the term "privacy" is notoriously hard to define.105 The concept 
of privacy in New Zealand is still in the course of development and consequently the law in the area 
of privacy is rather unsettled. Though the Court of Appeal in New Zealand has accepted that there is 
a tort of privacy in New Zealand, 106  there is no express guarantee of a right to privacy in 
legislation.107 This article is solely concerned with what can be termed "informational privacy", 
which encompasses the control of, and access to, personal information.108 This could include the 
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ability to control the use to which personal information is put once disclosed. 109  The rapid 
advancement of the internet and associated technologies has had a notable impact on informational 
privacy, particularly in relation to the availability of personal information published online by 
private individuals.110 
An argument against allowing lawyers to research prospective jurors is that it will amount to an 
undue interference with informational privacy. However, it is important to highlight that "personal 
information" is not synonymous with "private information".111 Information placed on the internet 
by a prospective juror may be personal, but once it is published online it is no longer private. The 
prospective juror no longer has control over the personal information. It is arguable whether the 
access to that information by lawyers with a view to challenge is any different in principle to the 
access to that information by employers or landlords.112 That said, instances where information 
about a prospective juror is posted on the internet without their consent by a third party may give 
rise to a greater privacy concern.113  
To prevent any undue interference with the privacy interests of prospective jurors, it is 
recommended that guidelines governing the conduct of research be put in place. Among other 
things, the guidelines should include a safeguard limiting the scope of counsel research to 
information that is publicly available. Allowing lawyers to go through private information on a 
person's Facebook page that can only be viewed by "friends" of the person would be an undue 
interference with privacy. Likewise, "friending" of a prospective juror on Facebook by a lawyer in 
order to access information on their page, sending them tweets, or otherwise attempting to contact 
prospective jurors would overstep appropriate degrees of separation between counsel and jurors.114 
In some instances, this may mean that access to information is limited, but such a limit is necessary 
to protect the privacy of prospective jurors and the integrity of the jury system. 
Pretrial internet research of prospective jurors pales in comparison with other methods of jury 
screening which may constitute a significant interference with their privacy interests.  As noted 
earlier, the research of jurors in the United States can include practices bordering on stalking. 
Prospective jurors are then subjected to public questioning, which may include intensely personal 
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enquiries. Online research of prospective jurors is a lot less invasive than other alternatives.115 It 
could be argued that condoning research by counsel on prospective jurors in the way proposed may 
give way to more intrusive measures being accepted further down the track. However, such a fear 
may be addressed through the proposed guidelines that will focus on the acceptable use of the 
internet to research prospective jurors. 
The practice of lawyers researching jurors pretrial may not significantly affect juror privacy 
interests in fact. However, juror perception of the practice and the extent to which it is perceived to 
interfere with privacy interests is an important consideration. As noted in P v R, "[jurors] are called 
on to perform a critical public service in the administration of justice".116 Some prospective jurors 
may be deterred from serving on the jury if they feel that it would entail an interference with their 
privacy. Any factor that may deter members of the public from serving on the jury threatens to 
undermine the integrity and representativeness of the jury system.117  
There is a fear that deterrence of jurors from performing their civic duty will exacerbate the 
already low figures on jury attendance. In 2009, over 80 per cent of people summoned avoided jury 
service, either through excusal or by failing to show up.118 However, the introduction of a deferral 
system whereby summoned jurors may defer jury service to a more convenient time has had a 
positive impact on jury attendance.119 Figures obtained under an Official Information Act request 
show that, since the introduction of a deferral system in October 2010, jury attendance has 
improved.120 
Measures included in the proposed guidelines for lawyers conducting online research could go 
some way to putting jurors at ease. For example, the guidelines could provide that jurors should be 
informed that research may be undertaken for the purpose of peremptory challenge, but that any 
information obtained will be used for that purpose only and kept entirely confidential. 
B  The Issue of Self-Represented Defendants 
Linked to privacy concerns and the perceptions of prospective jurors is the issue of the self-
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represented defendant. Trial proceedings involving self-represented defendants are an area of 
concern that must be addressed when defining the bounds of pretrial research. As highlighted in P v 
R, the research into the personal backgrounds of jurors by a defendant is "entirely inappropriate and 
unacceptable". 121 Such a practice would give rise to serious concerns regarding the safety of 
prospective jurors and would be likely to deter members of the public from serving on the jury. One 
can imagine the possible disastrous consequences were certain self-represented defendants given 
access to prospective jurors' particulars for the purpose of conducting pretrial research. Such 
concerns could be addressed by extending certain provisions of the Juries Act. 
The availability of information about prospective jurors has been restricted significantly by 
Parliament out of concern for the privacy and safety of jurors. Section 13(1A) of the Juries Act was 
enacted in response to an incident in 2010 in which a convicted murderer contacted a juror whose 
name he saw on the jury panel list while representing himself at trial.122 The provision provides that 
only the names of prospective jurors are to be on the jury panel list. However, "litigants in person" 
are included among the list of "eligible persons" who may apply to the registrar of the court to have 
a copy of the jury panel list made available for inspection.123 Thus, self-represented defendants are 
eligible to inspect the jury panel list.  
However, self-represented defendants are not eligible to inspect the protected particulars of 
prospective jurors which are excluded from the panel list under s 13(1A). As noted earlier, 
"protected particulars" contain the address, occupation and date of birth of prospective jurors. 
Instead, a barrister or solicitor may be appointed by the registrar to exercise rights of challenge for 
litigants in person under s 14AC(1) if they so wish. A barrister or solicitor appointed under s 
14AC(1) may request, and exercise a challenge on the basis of, a copy of protected particulars under 
s 14AB(1). Section 14AC could be extended to protect prospective jurors in the case of self-
represented defendants by allowing a barrister or solicitor to be appointed for the purpose of 
conducting research with a view to challenge. Such a solution would ensure that the defendant 
receives a fair trial while protecting the safety of prospective jurors. 
C Reliance on Unauthenticated Information as Basis for Challenge 
The vast array of information on the internet is not necessarily validated or authenticated, but for 
many people today it is authoritative. If one wishes to know about something, one will simply 
"Google it". Researching the background of potential jurors with a view to challenge relies on two 
assumptions. First, such research assumes "it is the attitudes of jurors, not the evidence, which 
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determine how a jury decides a case".124 Secondly, lawyers rely on the assumption that information 
obtained using online tools is accurate. Information gleaned from a prospective juror's Facebook 
profile or information about what organisations they belong to will not necessarily provide an 
accurate picture of the personal background or attitudinal biases which a prospective juror 
possesses. An internet search of an individual may yield limited information, leaving lawyers to fill 
in the informational gaps with assumptions.  
Additionally, in the case of common names, lawyers run a risk of collecting information about 
the wrong person, rendering the whole process nugatory. Thus there is a danger in placing a heavy 
reliance of information obtained using the internet without any means of verification. Common 
sense dictates that lawyers conducting pretrial research on jurors keep in mind the potential for 
misinformation. 
D A Challenge With or Without Cause? 
The practice of researching jurors with a view to challenge may be open to criticism in that the 
peremptory challenge is, by nature, a challenge without reason. It could be argued that through 
pretrial research, what was designed to be a challenge "without cause" would transform into a 
challenge "for cause". However, given the high threshold required to establish a challenge for cause, 
such a transformation is unlikely.  
Under s 25 of the Juries Act, a successful challenge for cause requires that the juror in question 
"is not indifferent between the parties". The requirement of a lack of indifference sounds relatively 
easy to establish but in practice it is extremely difficult to substantiate.125 Prima facie, a reading of s 
25 requires that a potential juror be biased in fact. Therefore a non-specific bias held by a potential 
juror is not a sufficient basis for a challenge for cause.126 For example, the Court of Appeal in P v R 
held that the juror's communications did not prevent her from being indifferent between parties and 
thus would not have provided a basis to challenge for cause. 127 Research by lawyers into the 
personal background of prospective jurors is unlikely to provide evidence sufficient to form the 
basis of a challenge for cause, but it may uncover non-specific biases or attitudes unfavourable to 
their case. Lawyers will then be able to exclude prospective jurors with unfavourable non-specific 
biases from the trial. Thus it is argued that peremptory challenges still play an important role in 
securing an impartial jury.  
In sum, the practice of lawyers researching prospective jurors with a view to peremptory 
challenge may present some drawbacks. However, in light of the benefits the practice may bring, it 
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is argued that these drawbacks are limited and can be addressed through the introduction of 
guidelines. 
VI GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH ON JURORS 
It is argued that the justice system should embrace these new technologies and recognise that 
they are likely to be used by lawyers. Statutory regulation of the activity is an unrealistic option 
given the ease of access to the internet, which would make policing the practice difficult. Rather 
than attempt to suppress the practice of lawyers researching prospective jurors through prohibition, 
it is suggested that the best option is to incorporate guidelines into the Lawyers and Conveyancers 
Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, to govern the use of the internet for the 
purpose of researching prospective jurors.  
The guidelines proposed contain guidance for lawyers around the collection, use, retention and 
disclosure of information. The following guidelines are proposed. 
Guidelines for the pretrial research of prospective jurors with a view to challenge 
1 Proper purpose of collection 
 Pretrial research of prospective jurors should only be used for proper purpose, namely, to gather 
information to assist in the exercise of peremptory challenge. 
2 Use of information 
 Information about prospective jurors gathered through pretrial research should be used only in the 
exercise of a challenge. The use of the information obtained for personal purposes or any other 
purpose in inappropriate. 
3 Collection of information 
(1)  Research into the personal background of prospective jurors should be passive only. Lawyers 
may passively survey prospective jurors' social networking sites and the like but should not 
attempt to make contact with a prospective juror in any way. 
(2) The information collected should be limited to information that is publicly available. 
(3) Prospective jurors should be notified that, if a lawyer contacts them in breach of the guidelines, 
they can report the incident to the registrar of the relevant court. 
4 Disclosure of information 
(1) Information gathered through pretrial research should be kept confidential. 
(2) However, the relevant court may require a lawyer to disclose the method used to obtain 
information on prospective jurors if a prospective juror reports an incident to the registrar of the 
relevant court under Guideline 3(2). 
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5 Retention of information 
 Information collected for the purposes of challenge should not be retained after the jury for which 
the research was conduct has been secured. 
Guidelines 1 and 2 deal with the proper purpose of pretrial research and the proper use of 
information collected. Information should only be collected with a view to challenge. Any ulterior 
purpose for collecting information, such as a personal motivation, is outside the scope of the 
lawyer's duty to the court and client. Likewise, the proper use of information gathered through 
pretrial research is limited to the exercise of a challenge. Guidelines on the method of collection are 
equally necessary in ensuring that pretrial research does not interfere with privacy interests of 
prospective jurors. Setting out appropriate methods for collection of information also protects 
lawyers from facing allegations of impropriety in conducting pretrial research. Guideline 3(3) 
operates as both a policing mechanism of lawyers' conduct, and also as a protective mechanism by 
providing prospective jurors with an avenue of complaint.  
Guidelines 4 and 5 address any privacy concerns held by prospective jurors. Some prospective 
jurors may feel unease at having personal information being stored long after the jury selection 
process is over or shared with other people. Thus it is suggested that information should not be 
retained any longer than needed to exercise a challenge. Further, lawyers need not disclose 
information to persons not acting for the party that they represent. There is a caveat on the guideline 
for non-disclosure in instances where a prospective juror has reported behaviour of a lawyer in 
accordance with Guideline 3(3) in order to allow the registrar of the relevant court to investigate 
such reports.  
As acknowledged earlier, the nature of the internet makes effective policing of online research 
difficult. These guidelines focus on the appropriate way to conduct research on prospective jurors. 
As such, the guidelines do not provide a fail-safe method of controlling the practice of pretrial 
research of prospective jurors, but rather they are consistent with the overriding duty of lawyers to 
the court and their client in order to regulate the practice fairly. 
VII CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The use of the internet to research prospective jurors with a view to peremptory challenge has 
received little attention in New Zealand and, as acknowledged earlier, it is unclear just how 
widespread or common the practice is among New Zealand lawyers. At the heart of the fears 
surrounding the use of technology by various parties in a trial setting is the concern to protect the 
fundamental right to a fair trial. It is argued that, rather than aiming to place jurors "on trial", pretrial 
research of prospective jurors seeks to protect, rather than undermine, the right to a fair trial by 
giving lawyers a more informed basis on which to exercise peremptory challenge. Pretrial research 
of prospective jurors allows lawyers to access information, which may show actual or perceived 
biases, and prevents reliance on inaccurate and discriminatory stereotypes based on jurors' 
particulars.  
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Embracing the internet as a tool to obtain personal information about prospective jurors has the 
potential to revitalise the exercise of the peremptory challenge by increasing the impartiality of the 
jury, and the defendant's confidence in the final verdict. It is also suggested that the practice would 
enable a more zealous representation of clients by lawyers. As discussed, concerns about juror 
privacy arise more in relation to juror perception rather than in fact, as the information gathered is 
limited to publicly available information. However, legislative amendment would be needed to 
protect the safety of jurors in regard to self-represented defendants. Such protection could be 
achieved by simply extending the provisions in the Juries Act under which a lawyer may be 
appointed to act for self-represented defendants for the purposes of challenge.  
At a more fundamental level, the rapid development of digital technology has left the court 
system at somewhat of a crossroads. In the context of the peremptory challenge, technological 
advancement can either be embraced as a tool that serves to enhance and streamline current systems 
and processes, or it can be resisted, possibly at the expense of growth and development. Rather than 
resisting the use of the internet to research jurors, courts should endeavour to manage it by issuing 
guidelines to ensure that all parties to a proceeding receive a fair trial. The guidelines proposed 
highlight the appropriate method for conducting pretrial research and outline the parameters within 
which pretrial research is permitted.  
 
 
